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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a dynamic model of the foreign exchange market where some investors
in the market are more informed than others. By adjusting the proportion of informed
investors in the market, it is shown that the disconnect between macroeconomic variables
and the exchange rate is sensitive to the amount of asymmetric information in the market. A
surprising nding is that this disconnect is bigger when the proportion of informed investors
in the market is smaller.
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1 Introduction
The disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate has been well-
established in the exchange rate literature. A notable demonstration of this disconnect by Flood
and Rose (1995) shows that volatility of variables such as money and output does not appear
to be signicantly di¤erent during regimes of xed and oating exchange rates. A theoretical
explanation for this disconnect has been o¤ered by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) and they
demonstrate how information dispersion can cause rational confusion among investors, which
then magnies the disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate.
In this short paper, I build upon the explanation by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) and
show that the disconnect between macroeconomic variables and the exchange rate is sensitive to
the amount of asymmetric information in the market. By controlling the proportion of investors
who receive noisy private signals about future macroeconomic fundamentals on top of the public
signals that all investors receive, I can adjust the level of information dispersion in the model.
This additional control allows me to demonstrate that the response, as well as persistence, of
equilibrium exchange rate to fundamental and non-fundamental shocks is quite di¤erent for vary-
ing levels of asymmetric information in the market. The ndings also suggest that strengthening
the connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate might be possible
by increasing the proportion of investors holding more information in the market.
Recently, with the availability of customer order ow data, many researchers have shown
that the impact of order ow on the equilibrium exchange rate depends on the type of customers
initiating the order1. These ndings, coupled with the nding that dealers o¤er smaller spreads
to informed customers as shown in Osler, et al. (2010), suggest that di¤ering levels of impact of
customer orders on the equilibrium exchange rate might be due to di¤erent levels of information
they possess. This empirical nding is represented in the model of this paper through 1) the
noisy public signal every investor receives and 2) the noisy private signal only a proportion of
investors receive. The idea to control for the proportion of investors receiving the private signal
1Marsh and ORourke (2005), Bjonnes, et al. (2004, 2005), Onur (2008) and Fan and Lyons (2003) are only a
few. See Evans and Rime (2010) for a more detailed list of empirical papers in the eld.
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is motivated by an interesting paper by Marsh and ORourke (2005), where for di¤erent currency
pairs, they measure the probability of a dealer trading with an informed investor who might have
more information about the future of the exchange rate than dealers do. Authors o¤er a measure
called PIN (probability of informed trading) for six di¤erent currency pairs and for four di¤erent
customer categories and nd that the probability of a dealer trading with an informed investor
can be as low as 10 percent for certain currency and customer groups, whereas as high as over
60 percent for others. Even within the same customer groups, they report a gap of almost 20
percentage points from one currency pair to another. These ndings are good indication that
a theoretical model that allows for varying levels of asymmetric information in the market is
needed in the literature. In that regard, I extend the theoretical model by Onur (2008) into
a dynamic setting a la Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) to provide this needed theoretical
model.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3
outlines the solution to the model. Section 4 o¤ers results and analysis and section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
The setup of the model follows from Onur (2008). It is a two-country monetary model of exchange
rate determination with money market equilibrium, purchasing power parity and interest rate
parity assumed.
There is a continuum of investors in both countries and they are distributed on the [0; 1]
interval. I assume a myopic agent setup where agents live for two periods and make only one
investment decision. Investors are identical in the sense that they have the same utility function
and they know that exchange rate depends on the expectations of future fundamentals. Investors
in both countries can invest in money of their own country, bonds of the home country for a
return of it, bonds of the foreign country for a return of it , and in some type of production
with a xed return. This production is assumed to depend on the exchange rate as well as
on real money holdings of investor i, it. Thus, the production function is written as f (
i
t) =
itst+1   it (ln (it)  1) =, for  > 0. The coe¢ cient it is the exchange rate exposure variable.
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Investor i will want to hedge himself, and this hedge against non-asset income will add to the
demand in the foreign exchange market. An investors hedge demand changes every period and
it is known by the investor himself only.
Investor i maximizes his expected discounted future utility conditional on information known
at t, F it , and his budget constraint. The maximization problem can be written as
max  Et
h
e c
i
t+1jF it
i
(1)
subject to cit+1 = (1 + it)w
i
t + (st+1   st + it   it)Bit   itit + f
 
it

,
where wit is wealth at the start of period t, B
i
t is the amount invested in foreign bonds, and
st+1   st + it   it is the log-linearized excess return on investing in foreign bonds. Investor i
chooses the optimal amount of foreign bonds to hold and the rst order condition becomes
st = E
i(st+1)  it + it   2t;i
 
Bit + b
i
t

, (2)
where 2t;i = var(st+1) is the conditional variance of next periods exchange rate and b
i
t is the
hedge demand due to the exchange rate exposure of non-asset income, bit = 
i
t. I write the
interest di¤erential in terms of the exchange rate and fundamentals to obtain it  it = 1(st ft),
where the fundamentals are dened as ft = (mt  mt )2.
Investor is foreign bond demand can be written as
Bit =
Ei(st+1)  st + it   it
2t;i
  bit, (3)
Hedging demand emerging from the exchange rate exposure variable is assumed to be com-
posed of an average term and an idiosyncratic term, bit = bt + "
i
t. The average hedging demand
is unobservable to any of the investors but they know the autoregressive process it follows,
bt = bbt 1 + "
b
t , where "
b
t  N(0; 2b).
Applying this market equilibrium condition to (3) yields
2Note that mt and it are logs of money supply and interest rate respectively.
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Et(st+1)  st = it   it + bt2t , (4)
where Et is the average expectation across all investors. Using equation (4) and the denition
of fundamentals, the equilibrium exchange rate is given by
st =
1X
k=0


1 + 
k
E
k
t
 
ft+k   2t+kbt+k

, (5)
where E
k
t are expectations of order k > 1, dened as E
k
t (st+k) =
R 1
0
Eit

E
k 1
t (st+k 1)

di with
E
1
t (st+1) = Et(st+1) and E
0
t (st) = st.
2.1 Information Structure
As well as observing all past and current values of fundamentals, investors also observe signals
regarding future fundamentals. All investors in the market receive a noisy public signal about
the future value of fundamentals. Asymmetric information arises from the fact that a proportion
of investors also receive a noisy private signal about the future value of fundamentals in addition
to the public signal received by every investor. I use ! to denote the proportion of investors
who receive just the public signal. Throughout the paper, I choose to call them uninformed
investors for tractability reasons. The remaining proportion of investors, 1  !, are classied as
informedinvestors. Note that changing the ratio of informed investors to uninformed investors
in the economy is equivalent to choosing how much private information exists in the market3.
I Assume that the fundamentals in the economy are governed by the process
ft = D(L)"
f
t , "
f
t  N(0; 2f ), (6)
where D(L) = d1 + d2L+ d3L2 + :::.
I also assume the noisy public signal received by all investors to be denoted by zt and the
noisy private signal received by informed investor i to be denoted by it. These signals carry
3 When ! = 1, every investor in the economy is receiving only the public signal so all are uninformed, and
when ! = 0, every investors is receiving both of the signals so all of them are informed.
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information about the value of the fundamental T periods ahead, ft+T . In the economy, let the
noisy public signal be structured in the following manner:
zt = ft+T + w
z
t where
wzt = zw
z
t 1 + "
z
t "
z
t  N(0; 2z) (7)
The public signal is composed of two components, the actual value of future fundamentals
and a persistent term, wzt . I assume that this persistent term follows an autoregressive process
with z < 1.
4 The error term, "zt , is independent from the value of future fundamentals and it
is unknown to investors at time t. In this setup, public signal does not reveal the exact value
of future fundamentals to the investors. On the other hand, the structure of the noisy private
signal is:
it = ft+T + "
i
t "
i
t  N(0; 2), (8)
where error term of the signal being independent from ut and other investorssignals. Due to
the law of large numbers, I assume the average signal received by informed investors to be ut,
namely
R 1
1 ! 
i
tdi = ut.
2.2 The Equilibrium Exchange Rate
I adopt a solution method suggested by Townsend (1983) and successfully applied to an exchange
rate model by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006). The solution method realizes that the
equilibrium exchange rate and its components can be represented by a combination of current
and past shocks to the economy. Realizing that ft = D(L)"
f
t and bt = G(L)"
b
t ; where D(L) =
d1 + d2L + d3L
2::: and G(L) = 1 + bL + 
2
bL
2 + ::: where L is the lag operator, equation (5)
can be represented in terms of current and past innovations. The next step is to conjecture a
representation for the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of current and past innovations and
4The fact that zt has a persistent term permits the public signal to be written in terms of its current and past
innovations when conjecturing the equilibrium exchange rate.
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then use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients solution technique to solve for the equilibrium
values of the coe¢ cients. The conjectured exchange rate depends on shocks to observable and
unobservable fundamentals:
st = A(L)"
f
t+T +B(L)"
b
t + C(L)"
z
t (9)
where A(L), B(L), and C(L) are innite order polynomials in L. Only a portion of these
innovations are unknown to the investor. At time t, investors observe todays fundamentals as
well as innovations from previous periods. That means values of "f between t+ 1 and t+ T are
unknown to the investor. Investors also do not observe the non-fundamental shocks, "b, between
t and t  T , as well as the public information shocks, "z, between t and t  T . Non-fundamental
and public shocks before time t  T are known by the investors.
Detailed solution of method of undetermined coe¢ cients involves using equation (9) and the
distinct information structure of two types of investors in the market to compute Et (st+1) and
2t . Once they are written in terms of innovations, I match their coe¢ cients with the initial
conjecture to nd the equilibrium exchange rate. Note that both of the terms Et (st+1) and 2t
depend on the amount of asymmetric information in the market, !.
3 SOLUTION TO THE MODEL
This section outlines the solution to the model. Note that in the model, the equilibrium exchange
rate depends on the true value of future fundamentals T periods ahead. Accordingly, todays
signals reveal the true value of fundamentals and non-fundamentals from T periods ago. As
a result, expectations of future fundamentals at time t are a¤ected by signals from previous
periods.
In the conjectured exchange rate in equation (9), the exchange rate is written in terms
of observed and unobserved innovations. Using the conjectured exchange rate, rst Et (st+1)
and 2 are written in the same manner. Following equation (9), st+1 is represented as st+1 =
A(L)"ft+T+1+B(L)"
b
t+1+C(L)"
z
t+1 and following Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) closely, the
same equality can be re-written as:
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st+1 = a1"
f
t+T+1 + b1"
b
t+1 + c1"
z
t+1 +
0t| {z }
unobservables
+A (L) "ft +B
 (L) "bt T + C
 (L) "zt T| {z }
observables (10)
where 0t =

"ft+T ; :::; "
f
t+1; "
b
t ; :::; "
b
t T+1; "
z
t ; :::; "
z
t T+1

denotes the vector of unobservables and
0 = (a2; a3; :::; aT+1; b2; b3; :::; bT+1; c2; c3; :::; cT+1) is the vector of coe¢ cients matching those
unobservables. The polynomials corresponding to the observables part of equation (10) are
represented as:
A (L) = (aT+2 + aT+3L+ :::)
B (L) = (bT+2 + bT+3L+ :::)
C (L) = (cT+2 + cT+3L+ :::)
Thus, the expected value of tomorrows exchange rate is written as:
Eit (st+1) = 
0Eit (t) + A
 (L) "ft +B
 (L) "bt T + C
 (L) "zt T (11)
and
2 = var (st+1) = a
2
1
2
f + b
2
1
2
b + c
2
1
2
z +
0var (t) (12)
The next step is to estimate Eit (t) and var (t) as functions of past innovations for the two
di¤erent kinds of investors in the market.
3.1 Conditional Expectations for Informed Investors
The rst step is to create a new vector of observables that carry only the information
that is new to the investor. I subtract the known components from the observables st, it, and
zt to dene new variables st , 
i
t , and z

t . The vector of these unknown variables would be
Y it =
 
st ; s

t 1; :::; s

t T+1; 
i
t ; 
i
t 1; :::; 
i
t T+1; z

t ; z

t 1; :::; z

t T+1

. Y it vector provides information
on the vector of unobservables t. Realizing that
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st = a1"
f
t+T + a2"
f
t+T 1+ :::+ aT "
f
t+1+ b1"
b
t + b2"
b
t 1+ :::+ bT "
b
t T + c1"
z
t + c2"
z
t 1+ :::+ cT "
z
t T
it = d1"
f
t+T + d2"
f
t+T 1 + :::+ dT "
f
t+1 + "
i
t and
zt = d1"
f
t+T + d2"
f
t+T 1 + :::+ dT "
f
t+1 + "
z
t + z"
z
t 1 + 
2
z"
z
t 2 + :::
everything can be represented in a more compact format:
Y it = H
0t + w
i
t (13)
where wit =
 
0; :::; 0; "it ; :::; "
i
t T+1; 0; :::; 0
0
.
Realize that the unconditional means of t and w
i
t are zero and let their unconditional vari-
ances be eP and R respectively5.
Following Townsend (1983), the conditional expectation can be written as:
Eit (t) = MY
i
t
where M = ePH hH 0 ePH +Ri 1 (14)
and the conditional variance of t, P  var (t), is given by P = eP  MH 0 eP .
3.2 Conditional Expectations for Less-informed Investors
Following the same steps, rst I dene the new information vector. I keep the general
notation the same but use a di¤erent superscript for these investors.
Let Y ut =
 
st ; s

t 1; :::; s

t T+1; z

t ; z

t 1; :::; z

t T+1

be the new information vector for unin-
formed investors. Less-informed investors use only the public signal and the exchange rate to
provide information on the vector of unobservables t. These signals are demonstrated as:
st = a1"
f
t+T + a2"
f
t+T 1+ :::+ aT "
f
t+1+ b1"
b
t + b2"
b
t 1+ :::+ bT "
b
t T + c1"
z
t + c2"
z
t 1+ :::+ cT "
z
t T
and zt = d1"
f
t+T + d2"
f
t+T 1 + :::+ dT "
f
t+1 + "
z
t + z"
z
t 1 + 
2
z"
z
t 2 + :::
Thus, the known component is written as6:
5Appendix A shows how H, eP and R are represented in matrix format.
6Matrix notation for Hu can be found in appendix A.
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Y ut = H
u0t, (15)
and the conditional expectation is written as:
Et (t) = M
uY ut
where Mu = ePHu hHu0 ePHui 1 , (16)
and eP is again the unconditional variance of t. The conditional variance of t, P u  var (t), is
given by P u = eP  MuHu0 eP .
3.3 Tracing Out the Solution
First, I derive 2 by substituting var (t) into equation (12). The next step is to write average
expectation of tomorrows exchange rate in terms of innovations. This is done by combining
equations (13) and (14) for informed investors and (15) and (16) for uninformed investors. The
resulting representation becomes:
Et (st+1) = (1  !)0MH 0t + !0MuHu0t
+A (L) "ft +B
 (L) "bt T + C
 (L) "zt T , (17)
and I use the expressions of Et (st+1) and 2 to solve a xed point problem by equating these
equations to the conjectured exchange rate. This yields the solutions for coe¢ cients of A(L),
B(L) and C(L) polynomials7 and hence a representation for the equilibrium exchange rate in
terms of innovations. This representation allows for the impulse response functions and the
analysis presented in the next section.
7A description of the solution for the coe¢ cients can be found in appendix B.
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4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 1 through 4 show the dynamic impact of one-standard-deviation shock on the exchange
rate for di¤erent levels of asymmetric information in the market. The shocks are innovations to
future fundamentals, innovations to aggregate hedge demand (which represent changes in non-
fundamentals) and innovations to public signal. To be able to derive direct comparison with
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006), I follow their parameterization and set standard deviations
of all shocks to 0:01 except for that of public shock, which is 0:08. Other parameters used are
T = 8;  = 10;  = 500 and b = 0:8. Note that the model presented in Bacchetta and Van
Wincoop (2006) allow only for the analysis of cases where ! is equal to 0 and 1. This model also
allows for analysis when ! is between 0 and 1.
When each shock is analyzed separately, it is clear that the instantaneous response of the
exchange rate to public shocks is highest in gure 4, when 90 percent of investors are receiving
only public signal and only the remaining 10 percent are receiving both the public and the private
signal. Naturally, magnitude of this response is lowest for gure 1 when ! = 0:1. This magnitude
increases as ! increases.
When the instantaneous response of the exchange rate to future fundamental shocks is an-
alyzed, gure 1 depicts the case with the biggest response. This is true because there is more
information about future fundamentals in the market due to very high proportion of the investors
receiving both public and private signals. The response decreases as ! increases.
A more surprising result is the instantaneous response of the exchange rate to the change
in non-fundamentals (b-shocks). It is obvious in gures 1 through 4 that impact of b-shocks is
substantial in all four cases. The impact increases as ! increases since less information about
future fundamentals causes a bigger (rational) confusion. When compared to the ndings of
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006), this postulates that every investor in the market does not
need to receive a private signal to create high magnitudes of disconnect. Actually, a small amount
of private information in the market is enough to cause the biggest instantaneous response of
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Function (w=0.1)
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exchange rates to non-fundamental shocks.
Impulse response functions also show that as ! increases, persistence of the non-fundamental
shocks increases as well. This means that when only 10 percent of investors are informed,
confusion due to non-fundamentals lasts the longest in the economy. As a result, that is also
the case when a shock to future fundamentals take the slowest path while converging to its true
level.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I extend the results of Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) by introducing a mech-
anism that allows the researcher to change the proportion of informed-to-uninformed investors
in the market. This is achieved by allowing every investor in the model to receive a noisy public
signal about future fundamentals but only a proportion of investors receiving their own noisy
private signal on top the public signal they receive. The main ndings are that as there is a
higher proportion of informed investors in the market, the e¤ect of a shock to future fundamen-
12
Figure 2: Impulse Response Function (w=0.3)
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
f-shock b-shock z-shock
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function (w=0.6)
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
f-shock b-shock z-shock
13
Figure 4: Impulse Response Function (w=0.9)
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tals on the exchange rate is higher. Also, the e¤ect of a non-fundamental shock on the exchange
rate is relatively high in the model as long as there is asymmetric information (due to rational
confusion). Surprisingly, a shock to non-fundamentals has the biggest e¤ect on the exchange rate
when the proportion of informed investors in the market is the smallest (10 percent). In other
words, rational confusion is the biggest when the amount of aggregate information about future
fundamentals in the economy is the lowest8.
This paper o¤ers a general model to match di¤erent foreign exchange markets with di¤erent
levels of PIN measures, as presented in Marsh and ORourke (2005). It also suggests that
while the disconnect between macro fundamentals and the exchange rate arises from information
asymmetry, the magnitude of this disconnect can di¤er from one currency market to another.
Results also show that only a small proportion of informed investors is all needed to create the
disconnect in any market. In conclusion, if one wanted to strengthen the connection between
exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals in any foreign exchange market, increasing the
8Note that this confusion is at its lowest level when no investor receives a private signal, as shown in Bacchetta
and Van Wincoop (2006). There is very little disconnect in the economy in that situation.
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proportion of investors holding more information (maybe through information disclosure) might
be a good idea.
References
[1] Bacchetta, P., and Van Wincoop, E. (2006) Can Information Heterogeneity Explain the
Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle?,American Economic Review, 96, No.3, 552-575.
[2] Bjonnes, G., Rime, D., and Solheim, H. (2004). Liquidity Provision in the Overnight Foreign
Exchange Market, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 177-198.
[3] Bjonnes, G., Rime, D., and Solheim, H. (2005). Volume and Volatility in the Foreign
Exchange Market: Does It Matter Who You are?  in Exchange Rate Economics: Where
Do We Stand? Paul De Grauwe (ed.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 39-63.
[4] Evans, Martin D. D., and Rime, D. (2010). Micro Approaches to Foreign Exchange Deter-
mination,Working Papers No 10-4, Georgetown University .
[5] Fan, M., and Lyons, R. (2003) Customer Trades and Extreme Events in Foreign Exchange
in Essays in Honor of Charles Goodhart, Paul Mizen (ed.), Edward Elgar: Northampton,
MA, USA, pages 160-179.
[6] Flood, P., R., and Rose, K., A. (1995). Fixing Exchange Rates A Virtual Quest for Fun-
damentals,Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 3-37.
[7] Marsh, W., I. and ORourke, C. (2005). Customer Order Flow and Exchange Rate Move-
ments: Is There Really Information Content?Cass Business School, London.
[8] Onur, E. (2008). The Role of Asymmetric Information Among Investors in the Foreign
Exchange Market,International Journal of Finance and Economics 13, 368-385.
[9] Osler, C., Mende A., and Menkho¤, L. (2010). Price Discovery in Currency Markets,
Working Papers No 03, Brandeis University
15
[10] Townsend, Robert M. (1983), Forecasting the Forecasts of Others, Journal of Political
Economy 91, 546-588.
A Appendix A
Matrices H and Hu and the unconditional variances of t and w
i
t ( eP and R respectively) are as
follows.
H =
26666666666666666666666666666664
a1 a2 : aT b1 b2 : bT c1 c2 : cT
0 a1 : aT 1 0 b1 : bT 1 0 c1 : cT 1
:
0 0 : a1 0 0 : b1 0 0 : c1
d1 d2 : dT 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 0
0 d1 : dT 1 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 0
:
0 0 : d1 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 0
d1 d2 : dT 0 0 : 0 1 z : 
T 1
z
0 d1 : dT 1 0 0 : 0 0 1 : T 2z
:
0 0 : d1 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 1
37777777777777777777777777777775
3TX3T
Hu =
26666666666666666666664
a1 a2 : aT b1 b2 : bT c1 c2 : cT
0 a1 : aT 1 0 b1 : bT 1 0 c1 : cT 1
:
0 0 : a1 0 0 : b1 0 0 : c1
d1 d2 : dT 0 0 : 0 1 z : 
T 1
z
0 d1 : dT 1 0 0 : 0 0 1 : T 2z
:
0 0 : d1 0 0 : 0 0 0 : 1
7777777777777777777775
2TX3T
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eP =
26666666666666666666666666666666666666664
2f 0 : : 0 0 0 : : 0 0 : : 0 0
0 2f 0 0 : : 0
: : : 0 : : 0
: : : 0 : : 0
0 : : : 2f 0 0 :: 0 0 : : 0 0
0 0 : : 0 2b 0 : : 0 0 0 : : 0
0 0 0 2b 0 0
: 0 : : : 0
: 0 : : : 0
0 0 : : 0 0 : : 2b 0 0 : : 0
0 0 : : 0 0 0 : : 0 2z 0 : : 0
0 : : : 0 2z 0
: : : : : :
: : : : : :
0 0 : : 0 0 0 : : 0 0 0 : : 2z
37777777777777777777777777777777777777775
3TX3T
and
R =
26666666666666666666666666666664
0 : : : 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0
: :
: :
0 : : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0
0 : : 0 2 : : 
2
 0 : : 0
: 0 : : : 0 :
: 0 : : : 0 :
0 : : 0 2 : : 
2
 0 : : 0
0 : : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0
: :
: :
0 : : : 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0
37777777777777777777777777777775
3TX3T
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B Appendix B
There is need to solve only nite amount of coe¢ cients since for lags T and greater, coe¢ cients
can be derived from each other using the following equations:
aT+1+s =
1 + 

aT+s   1

ds
bT+s+1 =
1 + 

bT+s + 
2T+s 1b
cT+1+s =
1 + 

cT+s for all s > 1
The method I use to nd the conjectured coe¢ cients is to assume starting values for them,
solve the equilibrium exchange rate equation using those starting values and use the newly
found values as new starting values and keep iterating and solving the equilibrium exchange rate
equation until little or no change in the values is realized.
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